Analysis: The Role Russia Played in the Israel-Syria Missile Clash
Syria’s missile fire at Israeli warplanes may indicate that Assad and his Russian protectors are not fully coordinated.
Anshel Pfeffer Mar 19, 2017 8:36 AM
Over the six years of the Syrian war, dozens of airstrikes carried out against Hezbollah targets there have been ascribed to Israel. Until now the government has refused to acknowledge or deny them. Both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman have stated publicly that Israel does attack in Syria to defend its strategic interests – in other words, preventing Hezbollah obtaining “balance-breaking” weapons for its arsenal in Lebanon. The attacks that took place early Friday were the first to be confirmed officially by the Israel Defense Forces spokesperson. While it remains unclear what the target or targets were – was it a Hezbollah convoy, a weapons factory or storage, and whether a senior Hezbollah commander was killed in the airstrike as some reports in the Arab media have claimed – a series of important questions arise from the little information that has been published.
First, why has Israel changed its policy and suddenly acknowledged an attack? Syria’s air-defense forces launched a long-range missile in an attempt to shoot down Israel’s fighter-jets. The missile was fired much too late to endanger the planes, but could have fallen on civilian areas within Israel and was therefore intercepted by an Arrow 2 missile. The loud explosion which was heard as far as Jerusalem and the missile parts that fell in Jordan meant that some explanation had to be given. But a statement on the missile intercept would have been sufficient. The decision to take responsibility for the attacks as well would have been made by the prime minister and may have been made for other reasons.
Exactly a week before the attacks, Netanyahu was in Moscow discussing Syria with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Few details have emerged regarding what was said in the meeting but Netanyahu said before and after that he made it clear that Israel would not agree to Iranian military presence in Syria, or that of Iran’s proxies, now that the civil war in the country seems to be winding down and President Bashar Assad’s rule has been preserved.
Whether or not this demand was met with a receptive audience, Netanyahu returned to Jerusalem with the impression that Putin takes Israel’s concerns seriously. An attack carried out by Israeli warplanes flying over Syria (and not using standoff missiles from afar as happened in other strikes recently) may be an indication that there is an understanding with Russia over Israeli operations within the area that Russia protects with its own air-defense systems.
Friday’s strikes resemble closely the pattern of the attack in December 2015 on a Damascus suburb in which nine operatives working for Iran were killed, including Samir Kuntar, the murderer of an Israeli family who had been released by Israel in a prisoner exchange in 2008 and was believed to be planning new cross-border raids. That strike took place just three days after Netanyahu and Putin had spoken by telephone and was the first to be carried out after Russia had placed an air-defense shield over large areas of Syria, including its capital.
It was unlikely then, back in December 2015 and on Friday, that Israel would have attacked in Syria, within Russia’s zone of operations, if it thought the Kremlin would react with anger. The fact that it was the Syrian army which launched a missile against Israel’s warplanes, while there are much more advanced Russian air-defense systems deployed nearby, ostensibly to protect the regime, could also indicate that Assad and his Russian protectors are not fully coordinated. Assad is aware that Putin is discussing his country’s future with other world leaders, including Netanyahu. His belated attempt to shoot down Israeli planes could be a sign of frustration at his impotence to control both his destiny and his airspace.
Original post haaretz.com
Has Israel Actually Sent The F-35 Into Combat Already? Here
SA-5 Gammon S-200 Angara Vega Dubna Ground-to-air missile system
The S-200 SA-5 GAMMON is a medium to high -altitude surface-to-air missile system. The single-stage missile has four jettisonable, wraparound solid propellant boosters, each of which is is 4.9 m long and 0.48 m in diameter with a single fin spanning 0.35 m from the booster body. The missile is 10.72 m long overall with a wing span of 2.85 m. The main body is 0.85 m in diameter and has a solid fuel dual thrust sustainer rocket motor.
Each missile battalion has one 320 km range P-35M BARLOCK-B E/F-band target search and acquisition radar with an integral D-band IFF system, one 270 km range SQUARE PAIR H-band missile guidance radar, and six trainable semi-fixed single rail launchers.
The missile’s minimum range of 60 km is due to the booster burn time and jettison requirements, limiting the system to engagements against relatively large unmaneuverable targets at ranges up to 250 km. Guidance beyond the 60 km booster jettison point is by course correction command signals from the SQUARE PAIR radar with the S-200’s own active radar terminal homing seeker head activated near the projected intercept point for final guidance.
The large HE warhead is detonated either by a command signal or the onboard proximity fusing system. When fitted with a nuclear warhead only the command detonation option is used. Source fas.org
Surface to Air Missiles
Highly detailed Soviet era Fakel cutaway of the 5V28VE missile, marked “Sov. Secret” (Restored version via http://www.S-200.de – click diagram to expand). – Image: ausairpower.net
P-35M BARLOCK-B E/F-band target search and acquisition radar
|Associated weapon system||SA-5|
SQUARE PAIR H-band missile guidance radar
Technical data S-200 SA-5 GAMMON
|Type of missile|
|single-stage, low- to high-altitude|
|Algeria, Azerbaidjan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Iran, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Libya, Moldova, North Korea, Myanmar, Poland, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russia.|
|command and/or active radar terminal homing
|217 kg (97 kg explosive) HE fragmentation with proximity and command fuzing optional 25 kt nuclear for nuclear warhead variants|
|static semi-fixed single rail trainable|
|Missile velocity range|
|Effective range and altitude|
(S-200) 7- 150 km
(S-200V) 7 – 250 km
(S-200D) 7 – 300 km
((S-200) 300 – 20,000 m
(S-200V) 300 – 29,000 m
(S-200D) 300 – 40,000 m
|Bar Lock-B (P-35M): search and acquisition radar
Square Pair (5N62): range missile guidance radar
Big Back (D-band): warning radar
|(S-200) 10.5 m
(S-200V) 10.8 m
(S-200D) 10.8 m
Technical data armyrecognition.com
Syrian SA-5 Air Defense Coverage
|Syria||6 Sites||4 Sites (Masyaf, Dar’a, Shinshar, Khalhale)|
Russian S400 Air Defense Coverage