China’s Troops in Pakistan May Be an Attempt to Bypass US at Sea

According to Sputnik

17:54 15.03.2016 (updated 18:35 15.03.2016)

Over the weekend, Indian media reported sighting Chinese troops in an area of the disputed Kashmir region administered by Pakistan along a crucial road-rail corridor. Experts say that the reports, if true, are an indication of China’s intention to back its economic interests by military power, and its goal to bypass US naval power on the high seas.

On Saturday, The Times of India reported that an unspecified number of Chinese People’s Liberation Army troops had been spotted at forward posts on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, with intercepts of Pakistani army communications indicating that the troops had arrived to assist in the digging of tunnels which are part of an alternative route to a major regional highway.

Chinese troops, the paper added, were first believed to be spotted in the region in 2015, in an area where a Chinese company is involved in the construction of a hydroelectric power plant.

On Monday, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said that he had “not heard about the incident mentioned,” Hindustan Times reported.

However, when asked whether the possible presence of Chinese troops may be connected to work on the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) rail and roadway infrastructure project, which runs through disputed territories in Kashmir, the spokesman reiterated the Chinese position that the Kashmir dispute is an issue “left over from history between India and Pakistan.” China, he noted, hopes that “the two countries can properly resolve the issue through negotiation and consultations.”

At the same time, Hindustan Times recalled, China has repeatedly noted that “the CPEC, which is part of [China’s] Silk Road initiative, is aimed at improving people’s livelihoods and in no way affects the status of the Kashmir issue.”

When completed, the network of roads and railways will connect western China to the southwestern Pakistani port city of Gwadar in Baluchistan province. Last year, Pakistan and China inked a 43 year lease deal on the deep sea port, situated on the coast of the Arabian Sea.


In the past, New Delhi has voiced its concerns over the project, with some officials warning that the project could be designed to “besiege India.” Other politicians and businessmen, meanwhile, have suggested that India might actually benefit from the infrastructure, which would grant the country access to Central Asian markets.

Last month, Pakistani officials reported that Islamabad was preparing a 10,000 strong special military force designated to protect Chinese nationals and enterprises along the CPEC. According to China Daily, Beijing had previously expressed security concerns for the growing number of Chinese engineers and technicians involved in economic projects in Pakistan (over 14,000 Chinese personnel are believed to be involved in 200+ projects in the country).

Interviewed by the independent Russian newspaper Svobodnaya Pressa, Pavel Kamenev, a senior researcher at the Institute for Far East Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences, began by noting that he could not rule out that the reports on Chinese troops in Pakistan were true.

“The port of Gwadar has great strategic significance for China, and is seen as an alternative to the Strait of Malacca, through which more than 80% of the oil imported by China presently flows, the analyst noted. “As is known, this strait if factually controlled by the United States,” he added.

“In May 2015,” Kamenev recalled, “China published a ‘White Paper’ on military strategy, in which it once again sought to assure the world about the defensive nature of its military policy. At the same time, the paper emphasized that China must create military capabilities which would be in accordance with its increased stature as a world power. It’s unclear what is embedded in this concept, since it open to broad interpretation.”

“I cannot rule out that the situation with Pakistan is the first sign of China reinforcing its economic expansion [using] physical protection. China, I should note, has many ambitions. [For example], it is now actively considering participating in Syria’s reconstruction, feeling that the need for this is great, especially given that it will help it to gain a foothold in the region. It has the resources – the personnel and money, to do so.”

For his part, Andrei Grozin, the head of the Department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan at the CIS Institute, agreed with his colleague, though he was more wary as to the accuracy of Indian media reports.

“Of course, we cannot say with certainty whether China really did send a military contingent to Pakistan or not. However, in any case, it can be said with certainty that Beijing is moving away from its old foreign policy tradition, which rejects the concept of force projection.”

Grozin suggested that Beijing’s foreign policy, which previously included development projects and work with elites, has shown signs of changes along with the country’s new leadership. “This has been expressed in its fight against Somali pirates, where Beijing, resting on a mandate from the UN, proceeds from its own interests. It is also expressed in China’s recent decision, for the first time, to create a military base outside the country – in Djibouti.”

“China is well aware that in today’s world, political will and military-political power can outweigh any economic influence. There have been many events that have forced Beijing to reconsider its policy, from the destruction of Libya, and the problems this caused for Chinese business, to the establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” conceptualized by American policy planners as one big anti-Chinese alliance. “Washington’s intrigues,” Grozin suggested, “have convinced China that all its transport and logistics projects should be supported by military and political assets.”

As for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, the analyst suggested that whatever problems the project may face, Beijing believes that it is strategically important to solve them.

“Baluchistan province is known for its problems with separatism, as is China’s Xinjiang province. There is also a threat [of instability] coming from Afghan territory. But considering the huge resources which China is investing in Gwadar port, I think these problems are solvable.”

“In my view, Beijing expects that the Sino-Pakistani economic corridor will connect not only the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road, but in the near future will be transformed into a significant point of dislocation for the Chinese Navy. After all, the work now being done [at Gwadar port] cannot be explained by economic considerations alone. The dredging and some of the technical aspects related to logistics suggest that the port will be important for Beijing from a military point of view.”

Finally, for his part, Vasili Kashin, an expert on the Chinese military-industrial complex at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, told Svobodnaya Pressa that while media reports about the PLA’s presence in Pakistan may be exaggerated, some representatives of the Chinese military or special forces would not be entirely out of place there.

“It can be assumed that in addition to the Pakistani military contingent formed to protect the corridor, China may send their advisors and some units of the People’s Armed Police, who can work directly to protect Chinese citizens. The logic could be that Chinese [workers] would be much more comfortable if they knew they could turn to a Chinese officer.”

“In other words” Kashin noted, “Chinese troops in Pakistan will likely perform coordination and communications functions, rather than combat missions.”

As for Gwadar port, the expert suggested that Chinese-Pakistani cooperation in its development was “a normal economic decision, but also related to considerations of strategic security. It will allow freighters to bypass a possible bottleneck in the Malacca Strait, if the situation in the South China Sea becomes problematic.”

“Additionally, the corridor is beneficial from an economic point of view, allowing for the delivery of cargo by land transport directly to a port on the Indian Ocean, from where ships can proceed to the Middle East. For shippers in western China, it may prove to be even cheaper to use land transport to carry goods to the Port of Gwadar, than to a Chinese port.”

As for possible fears about Gwadar’s militarization, Kashin suggested that there is no evidence to suggest that it is being turned into a base for the Chinese Navy.

“I do not think that Beijing intends to build a full-fledged military base in Pakistan, given that even its officially confirmed project in Djibouti is only a supply point. Moreover, China has recently seen a period of rapprochement with India and the government of Narendra Modi.”

“Thirdly, if we recall the circumstances of the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan, China at the time took pains to emphasize its neutral and balanced position. I do not think that Beijing has any desire to become hostage to the situation if another conflict between Pakistan and India were to break out. Therefore, I believe that the Chinese Navy may use this port as a port of call for resupply, but nothing more.”

Original post


China’s 6 Magical Economic Corridors


Published by The Market Mogul 


“China is investing a hefty sum ($900bn) in a project known as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative – this scheme seeks to boost integrated economic growth between Eurasia through mega infrastructure projects. The OBOR project includes 6 corridors under two roads, the New Silk Road Economic Belt running west towards Europe through Russia and Central Asian and the 21st Century Maritime Road focuses on reaching Europe through South Asia and Southwest Africa.”

“The 6 corridors demonstrated below run between: China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC); New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB); China-Central and West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC); China-Indo-China Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC); China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC).”


“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), one of the first of the 6 corridors to start construction is receiving $46bn and a further injection of $1.6bn agreed in August. The scale and scope of how large this is, the investment from China is approximately 20% of Pakistan’s GDP.”

“Most importantly, other planned corridors in the OBOR initiative aim to connect China to the Middle East, giving it direct access the Arabian Sea and the energy-rich Persian Gulf markets whilst also closing the distance by at least 10,000km.”  Source

China’s new silk road: What’s in it for Pakistan?

Published by DAWN

Zofeen T. Ebrahim — Updated Apr 20, 2015 03:40pm


Source: SCMP

“Pakistan’s strong ties with China may mean the initiative succeeds where other regional energy projects have become mired in security problems and political disagreements, says Vaqar Zakaria, energy sector expert and managing director of environmental consultancy firm Hagler Bailley Pakistan.

“The Pak-Iran pipeline is on hold, the World Bank-backed Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project has to contend with security issues relating to the passageway through Afghanistan, and importing power from India has to wait for core issues between the two countries to resolve,” he said.”  Source

China has various dual-use port arrangements with countries in the Indian Ocean that give Chinese civilian vessels and naval vessels some security.

Becoming a Maritime Power? – The First Chinese base in the Indian Ocean

Posted by Center of Maritime Security 


Strategic Rationale         

The increasing importance of the Indian Ocean to vital Chinese maritime interests form the rationale of having a Chinese base in the area. Although the official white paper “China’s Military Strategy” did not explicit confirm an out-of-area naval base, it did designate several reasons requiring the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) presence in Indian Ocean. A base in the Horn of Africa is consistent with the strategic shift from solely “offshore waters defense” to a combined “offshore waters defense” and “open seas protection.”

The white paper states that the “traditional mentality that ‘land outweighs sea’ must be abandoned” especially regarding sea lines of communication (SLOCs), of which, exports of manufactured goods and crude oil imports are paramount. Since a significant share of these rely on Indian Ocean sea lines, an out-of-area naval presence is almost a necessity. The February PLAN exercise in Lombok Strait sent a strong signal of the increasing Chinese naval footprint in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the PLAN has responded to several non-traditional security contingencies near the Horn of Africa. For instance, the PLAN has conducted a series of evacuation operations in the nearby states of Yemen, Libya, and Syria. China has also operated in the Gulf of Aden as a part of the international anti-piracy force since 2008. The official white paper states that the abilities and experiences in dealing with non-traditional challenges should be extended into traditional security areas.  Source

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